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ABSTRACT 
 This study argues that principal-agent theory provides a unique perspective on the 
relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani state. This perspective assists 
in developing strategies to reduce, disrupt, or eliminate the support that the Taliban 
receive from Pakistan. Furthermore, the framework of this study can be applied to other 
state-sponsored terrorist groups, insurgencies, and proxies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 21, 2016, a man carrying a Pakistani passport with the name Wali 
Muhammad was returning from a trip to neighboring Iran. He noticed additional security 
on the Pakistani side of the small border town. Wali and he was stopped briefly, but he 
resumed his journey after a couple of hours of delay.1 It would take eight more hours to 
travel from the Iran-Pakistan border to his destination and home in Quetta, most of which 
he spent calling several close family members. Wali Muhammad never reached Quetta. Six 
hours into the final leg of his travels, a United States (U.S.) drone strike—the first (and 
last, to date) in Balochistan—targeted his vehicle and the munition that struck the vehicle 
ended his life. The New York Times later reported that within minutes, Pakistani security 
forces arrived at the scene—suspiciously quick for such a remote area with normally 
limited visible presence of the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s official response was a muted 
protest to the U.S. about a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. Within 24 hours of the strike, 
it became clear that Wali Muhammad was traveling under a false name. The United States 
and Afghanistan announced that a leader of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad 
Mansour, had been killed in the strike.2 
Over the following months, details emerged about the period leading up to the death 
of Mullah Mansour. Sources within the Taliban organization described the leader as 
growing fearful of Pakistan. Mansour had rejected several demands from Pakistan and 
sought to diversify the organization’s sources of support to include other countries.3 His 
phone calls to his family were an indication that he knew something was wrong. 
How could the leader of the Taliban fear one of the group’s largest sponsors? Why 
would Pakistan orchestrate or condone the killing of someone who had lived safely in 
Pakistan for years? How had their relationship deteriorated to this point? The answers to 
                                                 
1 Carlotta Gall and Ruhullah Khapalwak, “Taliban Leader Feared Pakistan Before He Was Killed,” 
New York Times, August 9, 2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/world/asia/taliban-
leader-feared-pakistan-before-he-was-killed.html 
2 Gall and Khapalwak. 
3 Gall and Khapalwak. 
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these questions are complicated, just as the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban 
has been and remains. 
A. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Pakistan’s support of the Afghan Taliban has numerous layers that have morphed 
into the current relationship that exists today. This relationship originates from Pakistan’s 
ties to the mujahideen who fought the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 
1989. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan was thrust into a civil war 
between the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime and Afghan warlords who fought to govern 
the country. This conflict left Pakistan caught between its rival, India, and an increasingly 
unstable Afghanistan. When the Taliban formed from these mujahideen fighters in 1994, 
Pakistan viewed the organization as a possible method of stabilizing Afghanistan. Their 
support contributed to the Taliban rapidly seizing 90% of Afghanistan between 1994 and 
1996. 
The events between the Taliban’s rise to power and today are well documented. 
The Taliban remained in control of most of the country until after the attacks on September 
11, 2001. Since the U.S. and Northern Alliance removed them from power, the Taliban 
now control more territory than at any point since 2001. Many observers of the Afghan 
conflict have blamed poor security and governance in Afghanistan for the resurgent 
Taliban.4 The Taliban benefits from the government of Afghanistan’s lack of control, but 
the support of Pakistan remains a significant source of their resurgence. Pakistan, through 
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has continued to support the Taliban post 9/11 for 
many reasons. Although the ISI has transitioned this support from overt to covert, Pakistan 
must hedge against an eventual U.S. withdrawal and prevent the establishment of any 
                                                 
4 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan’s Terrorism Resurgence: Al-Qaida, ISIS, and Beyond,” 
Brookings (blog), April 27, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghanistans-terrorism-
resurgence-al-qaida-isis-and-beyond/; Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure 
and Jihad,” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 7–40, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.7; Roger 
Mac Ginty, “Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State-Building in Afghanistan,” Conflict, Security & 
Development 10, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 577–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2010.500548. 
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government in Afghanistan that would be friendly to India.5 The U.S. has attempted 
multiple strategies to reduce Pakistan’s support, including incentivizing actions taken 
against the Taliban and imposing punitive measures for inaction or aid. It is clear that these 
strategies have failed to produce long-term or significant change in Pakistan’s behavior 
and without a reduction of Pakistani support to the Taliban, Afghanistan will continue to 
be in a warring state. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This project will answer the question: what actions can the U.S. take to disrupt the 
ISI-Taliban relationship? First, this project conducts an in-depth study of the relationship. 
Second, we examine the strengths and weaknesses of the relationship based on principal-
agent theory. Third, we propose strategies for disrupting the relationship based on the 
analysis. These strategies could include all tools available to the U.S. but focus on actions 
that could be taken by the military. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
State support for terrorist groups can take many forms, and its importance in the 
success or failure of a terrorist group has been debated. The type, quantity, and timing of 
the support may be critical to the success of a supported group, but drawbacks to this 
support have also been debated.6 Regardless of the dispute, examinations of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts between 1978 and 2008 have concluded that no COIN 
campaign in this period has been successful without a substantial disruption to tangible 
                                                 
5 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Why Pakistan Supports Terrorist Groups, and Why the U.S. Finds It so Hard 
to Induce Change,” Brookings (blog), January 5, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/
2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/; 
Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Rand Counterinsurgency Study, v. 4 (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008). 
6 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (RAND, 2001), xiii, 83, 
84–99, 100; David B. Carter, “A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups,” International 
Organization 66, no. 01 (January 2012): 5, 24, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000312; Christopher 
Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 151, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html. 
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support that the insurgents require.7 To understand this support better, a closer examination 
of the relationship is needed. The principal-agent model, among other things, is a theory of 
incentives that can be used to examine state-sponsored terrorism and the possible 
weaknesses in the relationship generally applied to legal state and non-state institutions.8 
Recently, the theory has been applied to conflicts in which some form of delegation 
occurs.9 
1. Theoretical Reasons to Delegate 
The principal-agent theory provides several reasons for delegation of authority to 
occur, thereby creating the principal-agent relationship. Allowing specialization and the 
benefit of comparative advantage is one reason.10 In other words, a principal will delegate 
to an agent that has a specialized skill that they are unwilling or unable to match. 
Empowering an agent to increase credibility in situations where short-term and long-term 
interests diverge is the second reason. By delegating to an agent, the principal is 
demonstrating a commitment since the agent may be less likely to back out of a promise 
than the principal. For example, many democratic governments have delegated interest rate 
management to a central bank. This situation prevents an elected official from manipulating 
interest rates for political purposes and demonstrates a commitment to controlling inflation. 
Ensuring that actions are taken in line with the principal’s preferences after the principal’s 
tenure has expired is the third reason why a principal will delegate. This act will ensure 
                                                 
7 Christopher. Paul, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/MG964z1.html. 
8 Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009); Joe Felter et al., Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-
Qaida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a459919.pdf; Tyler G Van Horn, “The Utility of Freedom: A 
Principal-Agent Model for Unconventional Warfare” (2011), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5624. 
9 Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 
no. 3 (June 1, 2010): 493–515, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709357890; Eric Rittinger, “Arming the 
Other: American Small Wars, Local Proxies, and the Social Construction of the Principal-Agent Problem,” 
International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 396–409, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx021. 
10 Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to 
State-Sponsored Terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 3, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00389.x. 
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that the principal’s policies will continue being enacted long after their power has subsided. 
Shared ideas and identities are the final motivation for delegation identified in the literature 
on principal-agent relationships. In other words, there is power in a shared ideology 
between the principal and agent. Plausible deniability is one motivation for delegation in 
state support of terrorism that is not identified in the literature on the principal-agent theory. 
This reason usually is present during illicit forms of delegation and needed when the 
principal fears some retaliation for an action. The lack of linkage in this principal-agent 
relationship allows the principal to benefit from the bad behavior without adverse reactions. 
A commonality among all these reasons for delegation is that the principal seeks to 
maximize the work done on their behalf by the agent.11 
2. Theoretical Reasons for Tension in the Principal-Agent Relationship 
Principal-agent theory provides several explanations for tension in a relationship in 
which delegation occurs. Shirking behavior occurs when the agent engages in conduct that 
advances the agent’s interests over the interests of the principal. Payoff structures and 
financial incentives can differ between a principal and the agent, increasing the probability 
of shirking behavior. Principal-agent relationships are often affected by differences in 
information between the principal and the agent.12 For example, a state sponsor has access 
to numerous sources of information including military organizations, diplomatic channels, 
and intelligence agencies. A terrorist group (even one with a state sponsor) has much more 
restricted access to information due to the underground nature of the organization. 
State sponsorship of terrorism results in many potential unintended consequences 
even if there is a convergence of preferences between the principal and the agent. The agent 
can fumble the execution, resulting in costs to the agent and the principal without any 
advancement of either’s interests. Plausible deniability can fail if the state cannot deny 
claims made by the terrorist group. A consequence of enhancing the agent’s capabilities is 
a reduction in the ability of the principal to control the agent. This lack of control can lead 
                                                 
11 Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?,” 3-6 
12 Byman and Kreps, 7. 
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to escalation by the agent. Finally, states have often employed terrorists as spoilers. An 
unintended consequence of using terrorists as spoilers occurs when the state’s policy 
changes to seeking a settlement from preventing peace. When this happens, the spoilers 
become an obstacle to the principal’s interests.13 
3. Control Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Relationships 
Control mechanisms within a principal-agent relationship seek to create a 
convergence between the agent’s behavior and the principal’s goal. The first control 
mechanism is to limit the scope of the delegation of authority. Second, the principal can 
engage in monitoring and auditing of the agent. Third, the principal can devote more 
resources to screening and selection procedures. One version of this control mechanism is 
utilizing multiple agents to provide a range of options to the principal. Another benefit of 
this method is that each agent can assist in monitoring the other agents and provide 
information to the principal. The fourth category of control mechanisms includes sanctions, 
punishment, withholding of resources, and the removal of a particular agent.14 
4. Strategies for the Counter-Terrorist 
Applying this theory to the relationship between a terrorist group and a state 
sponsor identifies four strategies for the counter-terrorists. First, the counter-terrorist could 
exploit the information gap between the sponsor and the supported group. Disinformation 
on the group’s competence or information on the divergence between the group’s agenda 
and that of their sponsor are examples of this strategy.15 Second, the counter-terrorist could 
increase the portrayal of the group as foreign agents to create a nationalist backlash against 
the group. This strategy turns the ideological convergence between a terrorist group and its 
state sponsor into a weapon that can be used against it.16 Third, the counter-terrorist could 
reduce a state’s deniability of their support for a terrorist group to increase the reputation 
                                                 
13 Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?,” 8. 
14 Byman and Kreps, 9–12. 
15 Byman and Kreps, 14. 
16 Byman and Kreps, 14–15. 
7 
costs of the sponsor. This strategy is viable because one of the primary reasons to delegate 
to a terrorist group is plausible deniability. By removing this reason for delegation, the state 
may choose to seek other methods to pursue its interests.17 Finally, the counter-terrorist 
can inflict high costs on the terrorists, primarily as a result of the group’s attacks on targets 
that benefit the sponsor. This increased cost could discourage the terrorist group and cause 
them to become disillusioned with their sponsor.18 
  
                                                 
17 Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?,” 15. 
18 Byman and Kreps, 15. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE ISI-TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP 
This chapter describes how the relationship developed between the Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Taliban and explains how significant events have shaped 
this affiliation. In particular, this chapter provides the historical context of how the Soviet-
Afghan War affected Afghanistan and Pakistan and what conditions led to establishing the 
relationship between the ISI and the Taliban. It further examines how the ISI came to 
support the Taliban, how the United States (U.S.) has understood the relationship between 
the ISI and Taliban, how the U.S. has simultaneously fought the Taliban while maintaining 
a relationship with Pakistan and the ISI, and finally the actions the U.S. has taken to address 
ISI support of the Taliban. 
A key point should be made to increase the clarity of our writing. Throughout the 
paper, we will use the term Taliban to refer just to the Afghan Taliban. While there are 
linkages between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, we do not treat these 
organizations as a unitary actor. The two groups have very different relationships with 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States. 
It is also important to note that multiple relationships in the region exhibit 
symptoms of the principal-agent problem. For example, the U.S. acts in some ways as a 
principal with Pakistan as an agent in the counterterrorism fight in Afghanistan. 
Additionally, the ISI is an agent of the Pakistani government, the Taliban leadership is an 
agent of the ISI, and the majority of the Taliban organization in Afghanistan are agents of 
the Taliban leadership in Pakistan. All of these relationships present opportunities and 
challenges to stopping or reducing Pakistan’s support of the Taliban. 
A. THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR, 1979–1989 
Pakistan first developed relations with Afghan proxies during the Soviet-Afghan 
war. This conflict was a bloody struggle that affected not only the Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan but sent significant ripples reaching the U.S., Pakistan, Asia, and throughout 
Europe. The U.S. and other nations relied on Pakistan to funnel aid to Afghan mujahideen 
to counter Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. It was during this period that Pakistan learned 
10 
that proxies could be utilized to further national interests. One organization that 
significantly changed during this period was the Pakistani ISI. The ISI transitioned from a 
discouraged unit within the Pakistani military to a sophisticated intelligence agency with 
access to the Saudi General Intelligence Department as well as the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency, essentially becoming the most powerful institution within Pakistan.19 It is 
organized into departments or directorates with different responsibilities. One of these 
elements has been named “Directorate S” by American intelligence officials. This 
department has been responsible for supporting the Taliban, Kashmiri guerrillas, and other 
violent Islamic radicals.20 In addition to institutional changes, billions of dollars and 
copious amounts of weapons flowed through Pakistan to the Afghan mujahedeen. The birth 
of this “Armaments Culture” took root in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
and the illegal arms markets are still present.21 From 1971 to 1988, the number of 
madrassas in Pakistan increased from merely 900 to approximately 8,000 official and 
25,000 estimated unregistered religious schools. A significant portion of these schools was 
assembled along the Pakistan-Afghan border and heavily funded by the Gulf States.22 
The almost decade-long occupation by the Soviets was extremely destructive of 
Afghan political, economic, and societal institutions.23 This included the killing of many 
of the members of the government prior to the creation of the communist regime. After the 
Soviet withdrawal, there were few people available to run the country. This destruction set 
the stage for future issues that Pakistan would soon need to fix. This damage prevented the 
Afghan state from functioning autonomously and led to the creation of the mujahideen and 
warlords as the new political power brokers. Economically, the war destroyed 
infrastructure that prevented Afghanistan from having any meaningful economy. Trade 
                                                 
19 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 180. 
20 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, First 
Edition (New York: Penguin Press, 2018), 47. 
21 Imran Ali and Xiaochuan Dong, “The Revenge Game: U.S Foreign Policy During Afghan-Soviet 
War and Afghan-Pakistan Falling Into Hell,” Asian Social Science 11, no. 27 (2015): 48–49, https://doi.org/
10.5539/ass.v11n27p43. 
22 Coll, Ghost Wars, 180. 
23 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 153–59. 
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deficits compounded with mounting debt led to crippling inflation. Additionally, from the 
political and economic damage, the conflict hurt the population as well. The rural areas 
were the least secured but housed the majority of the people. This lack of security led to 
over 6 million Afghan refugees residing outside of Afghanistan by the end of the war and 
a large number of the population internally displaced.24 This cycle of conflict was vicious 
in that it was now more natural for people to continue war than to create and contribute to 
a thriving country. 
B. AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, 1990–1993 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan began utilizing proxies to 
attempt to accomplish its national interest within Afghanistan. With their Cold War foe no 
longer present in this region, the U.S. transitioned efforts to Eastern Europe and left the 
burden to fix the spiraling situation in Afghanistan to Pakistan and ergo the ISI. The ISI 
had played a crucial role in training the mujahideen that led to the Soviet withdrawal and 
was poised with the capability and the desire to influence the Afghan government that 
would soon follow it.25 The ISI was instrumental in the creation of a coalition of seven 
Afghan mujahideen parties known as the Tanzeemat and influenced the formation of the 
Afghan Interim Government to oppose the Soviet-backed Najibullah government in 
Afghanistan, but complete acquiescence to Pakistani national interests was unattainable.26 
Although they provided aid to the Tanzeemat, Pakistan learned how difficult 
aligning political interest was, not only between Pakistan and the Tanzeemat but with the 
ISI as well. This lack of alignment was first seen during Afghan reconciliation when 
Pakistan supported the idea of a broad-based Afghan government that included Najibullah, 
but the Tanzeemat leaders and the ISI rejected it.27 ISI’s lack of control over the Tanzeemat 
was later seen during their inability to facilitate the release of ethnic Russian prisoners to 
                                                 
24 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 153–59. 
25 Coll, Ghost Wars, 172–75. 
26 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to 
Modernity (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 15–22. 
27 Khan, 20. 
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the Russian Vice President in December 1991.28 Lack of cooperation among groups within 
the Tanzeemat was also rampant. Coordinated military action was continuously professed 
but never brought to fruition. Infighting among the mujahideen leaders was commonplace, 
and operations directed by ISI were usually reluctantly performed only after the threat to 
remove support.29 While the Najibullah government lasted longer than most experts 
predicted, the Islamic State of Afghanistan was established on 26 April 1992 and with a 
large part due to the actions of the ISI. After the interim government was installed, multiple 
mujahideen groups continued to jockey for power. Third parties such as Pakistan, Iran, and 
the U.S. attempted to tip the scales to one leader or another, and this armed political 
struggle for supremacy continued to destabilize Afghanistan.30 
C. THE AFGHAN CIVIL WAR, 1994–2000 
The constant state of civil war in Afghanistan ran counter to Pakistani national 
interests. A stable and friendly Afghan government would provide Pakistan with strategic 
depth vis-à-vis India, and the ISI was charged with helping to create these conditions. The 
Taliban offered yet another proxy in which Pakistan could accomplish its national interests 
but crediting the creation of the Taliban to the ISI is overstating reality. The truth is that 
the Taliban movement was created through the ten years of Soviet invasion and the five 
years of civil war that followed. They were produced in refugee camps and madrassas 
located in the FATA31 and the result of when Afghans became infuriated with mujahideen 
leaders who were not fulfilling their social promises to the population.32 The link 
connecting the Taliban to the ISI can be traced to an event near Kandahar in which an 
Afghan warlord intercepted a convoy of Pakistani goods. The Taliban, who controlled 
Kandahar at the time, rescued the caravan and earned the gratitude of the ISI. This small 
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group of Pashtuns, who merely wanted to bring order and peace to a local area, now had 
the chance to obtain more lofty goals. The additional defeat of a local warlord and the 
capture of an ammunition depot in Spin Buldak elevated the group to compete against more 
seasoned mujahideen leaders, even the ISI-backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his group, 
Hezb-e Islami. At this point, the ISI recognized that Hekmatyar would not be the one to 
install a Pashtun-dominated, Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan and switched 
most of their support to the Taliban. The Taliban parleyed their skillful fighting with 
support from the Afghan people and a seemingly endless supply of human resources from 
madrassas in the FATA. The Taliban met little resistance as they began to push north and 
grew stronger as they accepted the enlistment of local warlords, but the expansion of 
Taliban control far from the historical Pashtun areas proved difficult. After an arduous back 
and forth of Taliban victories and defeats, the capture of Kabul occurred in September of 
1996. At this stage the Taliban controlled 70 percent of Afghanistan.33 The once local 
group of students now pursued a “pure Islamic state” throughout Afghanistan, which 
included the implementation of Sharia law.  
Pakistan and the Taliban’s close relationship was demonstrated by several events. 
Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan.34 The other two were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During 
the late 1990s, members of Directorate S supplied, armed, and trained the Taliban as part 
of an effort to legitimize them. Evidence suggests that this effort was to support Pakistani 
national interests. These interests included an end to the Afghan civil war and a Pakistan-
friendly Afghan government. However, over time, intelligence reports suggested that some 
ISI officers in Directorate S believed in the ideologies of their clients.35  
Throughout this period of Taliban rule, Pakistan continued to learn the difficulties 
of aligning political interest with proxy forces. During the Taliban offensive to control 
Afghanistan, the ISI attempted to align the Taliban with other ISI elements such as anti-
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Soviet mujahideen leader Dostum’s Junbish-e Milli and the Jalalabad shura. This merger 
would facilitate the unification of the north and provide an additional ISI backed 
mujahideen leader within the winning side. The Taliban rejected the offer and conducted 
an offensive to secure the north, independent of other factions.36 Later, the Taliban 
combined forces with Abdul Malik Pahlawan, a Pakistani backed mujahideen leader, and 
Dostum rival, to capture Mazar-i-Sharif. When he was only offered a deputy foreign 
minister post in contradiction with their previous agreement, Malik requested aid from the 
ISI to reconcile an issue with the Taliban in the settlement negotiations afterward. After 
ignoring ISI attempts to mediate the situation in Mazar-i-Sharif, the local population, who 
supported Malik, massacred thousands of Taliban and Mazar-i-Sharif was lost back to the 
Northern Alliance. Despite the challenges of controlling the Taliban during its rise to 
power, Pakistan had largely succeeded in achieving its national interests in Afghanistan. 
The Pakistani government was either not aware or did not concern itself with the fact that 
their proxy in Afghanistan was hosting a terrorist group that was about to conduct the most 
significant act of terror to date. The result of this attack would elevate the forgotten region 
to the world stage and derail Pakistan’s pursuit of its national interests. 
D. ISI-TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP DURING THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2001-2008) 
After the attacks on 9/11, the U.S. identified al Qaeda operatives as the perpetrators 
and prepared to capture or kill the leadership of the organization in Afghanistan. To 
accomplish these operations, the U.S. demanded specific obligations from Pakistan.37 A 
list of requirements was presented to Pakistan. Of particular note was a declaration that 
either Pakistan stands with the U.S. or against them, deny all logistical support from 
Pakistan to Osama bin Laden, provide all available intelligence about terrorist suspects, 
and be prepared to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban. In response, Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf stated that Pakistan was America’s friend but needed time to 
discuss the list of requirements with his advisors. Musharraf and his advisors feared that 
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India would take advantage of the moment and create a narrative that Pakistan was a state 
sponsor of terrorism. To preempt this, Musharraf created a set of talking points. These 
points included that the Taliban and al Qaeda were not the same and that the Northern 
Alliance could not rule Afghanistan because they were not Pashtun. He also cautioned that 
the U.S. should watch for Indian initiated lies attempting to expose Pakistan and terrorists 
as the same.38 
Although Pakistan had pledged its allegiance to the U.S., it was not able to cut ties 
completely with the Taliban. One of the people in ISI who was suspected of sympathizing 
with the ISI’s clients was its leader at the time of the 9/11 attacks, Mahmud Ahmed.39 He 
had a personal relationship with the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar. 
According to Ahmed, Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan were a peaceful Afghanistan and 
a reduction of poppy cultivation and opium production that was being exported to Pakistan. 
Mullah Omar had accomplished these goals for Pakistan. This opinion of the Taliban was 
not isolated to Ahmed and was expressed at numerous levels throughout the ISI. It would 
result in a new relationship based upon manipulation by Pakistan of both the U.S. and the 
Taliban. One that would meet U.S. demands while simultaneously achieving its goals in 
Afghanistan.40 
An example of the ISI supporting the Taliban at the expense of the U.S. can be seen 
during the initial phases of the war. The U.S. sought information from Pakistan on the 
number and locations of its officers and agents in Afghanistan. Pakistan reported that there 
had only ever been nine Pakistani agents in Afghanistan, but other estimates rose into the 
hundreds.41 In November 2001, Pakistan evacuated ISI and military personnel from the 
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airfield in Kunduz.42 It has been alleged that this included Taliban leaders as well as 
members of other terrorist organizations.43 
The U.S. was limited in its ability to apply pressure to prevent Pakistan from 
supporting the Taliban in fear of losing their support and destabilizing the country. 
Therefore, after Pakistan agreed publicly to help the U.S. war on terrorism, the U.S. 
adopted an ambiguous policy toward the ISI.44 Even though the U.S. promises to not 
distinguish between terrorists and their hosts or supporters, the U.S. exercised restraint in 
its dealings with Pakistan, assisted in increasing Pakistan’s security and governance 
capacities and sought concurrence from Pakistan’s government for actions in the region. 
This was far from the “with us or against us” mentality originally stated. The U.S. goal of 
a stable Afghanistan has been subordinated to the need for a stable Pakistan that could 
maintain strong control over its nuclear weapons. Additionally, preventing conflict 
between Pakistan and India remains important.45  
Pakistan took public actions that seemed to confirm its desire to support the U.S. 
President Musharraf promised to clean up the ISI. The head of the ISI, Mahmud Ahmed, 
was forced to retire.46 This became a recurring cycle in U.S.-Pakistan relations after 2001. 
The U.S. engaged Pakistan and encourage change in the ISI. Pakistan promised change and 
reform. However, no significant change occurred. There have been some assessments of 
this predicament. One reason could be that Pakistan had enduring interests with enduring 
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preference orderings and these are difficult or impossible to change.47 Another reason 
could be that leadership, both civilian and military, is unable to make the change.48 
American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence revealed in 
2007 and 2008 that Musharraf had authorized deniable support to the Taliban. This 
included retired ISI officers and other cutouts providing resources, up to but not including 
the flow of weapons to the Taliban.49 Despite the presence of overwhelming evidence of 
Pakistani duplicity, the American intelligence community continued to maintain that the 
lack of organizational control of individual agents within the ISI was to blame for their 
support for the Taliban.50 The belief was that individual officers and agents pursued their 
agendas and the military and civilian leadership were unable to stop them, but key members 
within the Bush administration were starting to doubt this lack of control. 
A critical event in U.S. policy toward Pakistan and the ISI during the Bush 
administration occurred in 2008. As Bush neared the end of his term as president, a bomb 
was detonated near the Indian embassy in Kabul. Intelligence confirming Pakistan 
influenced the targeting infuriated Bush and hardened his opinion of ISI as supporters of 
terrorists.51 The administration considered its options in response to the attack. Ultimately, 
the administration decided that it would no longer seek concurrence for actions taken inside 
Pakistan such as drone strikes and that it would expand authorities for conducting these 
actions.52 However, the administration did not want to break the relationship with Pakistan 
because of Pakistan’s strategic importance.53 The administration’s debate could be 
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summarized as being between one group that favored more engagement with Pakistan and 
a second group that believed in applying pressure through sanctions or other actions.54 
Additional administrators within the U.S. government were also beginning to view 
Pakistan through a different lens. By 2008, intelligence reporting had shaped Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen’s opinion on the competency of the ISI.55 
He concluded that the highest leadership of the ISI was held accountable by the military 
and civilian leadership of Pakistan. The middle of the ISI bureaucracy consisted of 
compartmented operations run by individuals with a variety of backgrounds. Finally, there 
was a portion of the ISI that was outside of the bureaucratic structure that included retired 
senior leaders with their relationships with militants. Admiral Mullen’s continuity between 
the Bush and Obama administrations would ensure these beliefs would continue to shape 
U.S. policy. 
Additionally, Eliot Cohen, counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 
questioned the U.S. relationship with the ISI. In late 2008, militants from an ISI proxy, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, attacked several targets in Mumbai, India and killed 166 people. 
Intelligence concluded that members of the ISI had at the very least supported the attack. 
Analysts determined that ISI had direct involvement in the planning and execution. The 
attack was another exposure of Pakistan and the ISI as supporters of militants. After the 
Mumbai attack, Cohen stated, “I think in some ways we were actually fighting the ISI.”56 
The Bush administration would end with a changed outlook on the relationship between 
the U.S. and Pakistan. 
E. ISI-TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP DURING THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION (2009-2016) 
When the Obama administration inherited the war in Afghanistan, the president 
initiated a review of the effort and its ties to American interests. In March 2009, President 
Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and the region. The analysis identified 
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defeating al Qaeda as the most significant U.S. interest in the area. Publicly, the president 
focused on this goal. In reality, the President continued the previous strategy of resourcing 
a counterinsurgency effort to degrade the Taliban while emphasizing the importance of 
defeating al Qaeda and ensuring Pakistan maintained control of its nuclear weapons.57 
In 2010, disagreement concerning the importance of Pakistan to the Taliban led the 
U.S. to pursue different policies toward Pakistan. General Stanley McChrystal (at the time 
commander of the International Security and Assistance Force) believed that the war could 
be won without addressing the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan and pursued a strategy that 
would accomplish this.58 The CIA used drone strikes against Taliban leaders within 
Pakistan as part of a broader leadership decapitation strategy. The State Department 
pursued talks with the Taliban and sought to influence Pakistan to align its actions better 
with U.S. interests. This lack of congruent policy prevented the U.S. from bringing to bear 
all instruments of national power in a focused manner. 
In 2011, Operation Neptune Spear, the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, altered U.S.-
Pakistan relations. The fact that the assault occurred in Abbottabad, near Pakistani military 
institutions, led many in the Obama administration to the hypothesis that Pakistan was 
either completely incompetent in its intelligence or willingly playing host to terrorist 
leaders. Information seized during the raid also caused the Obama administration to 
reassess the war in Afghanistan. This intelligence provided evidence that the Taliban had 
told bin Laden that he should not return to a future Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.59 
It now appeared that the Taliban no longer wanted to play host to terrorists and therefore 
was not an enemy that the U.S. needed to destroy. This information provided the Obama 
administration with evidence to begin creating a withdrawal plan in Afghanistan.60 
An opportunity that arose during the Obama administration that had not seemed 
possible since 2001 was negotiations with the Taliban. There were many concerns in the 
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administration on engaging the Taliban in negotiation talks. First, there was the possibility 
that the Taliban’s intent in proposing negotiations was to divide the NATO coalition 
fighting the war by appearing ready to compromise. Another fear was that the ISI would 
act as spoilers to any talks. There was also disagreement over whether talks with the 
Taliban should involve reintegrating low-level fighters first or focus on reconciliation with 
high-level leaders.61 A result of the discussions with the Taliban was that the Afghan and 
Pakistani governments could sense an end to or a reduction in U.S. involvement in 
Afghanistan. The Karzai administration felt that ISI’s policy was to help NATO leave 
Afghanistan with honor.62 
F. ISI-TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION (2017-PRESENT) 
In August 2017, the Trump administration revealed its new South Asia strategy.63 
While similar to the approach of previous administrations, there were several key 
differences including a conditions-based methodology, a long-term commitment to the 
region, and a focus on Pakistan’s role as a safe haven to terrorist groups. In January 2018, 
President Trump announced that the U.S. had suspended military aid to Pakistan based 
upon information that the ISI provided direct military and intelligence aid to the Taliban 
that resulted in the death of U.S. soldiers. This has been described as the most significant 
punitive action toward Pakistan since 2001.64 Although a unique punitive diplomatic 
reaction, the announcement only revealed the “new” strategy remains a continuation of 
previous administrations’ policies of manipulating only a single lever to influence Pakistani 
actions: money. The U.S. could have applied pressure to Pakistan in numerous ways. For 
example, the U.S. could have removed Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally. An 
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even more aggressive step would have been to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of 
terrorism.65 
G. SUMMARY OF U.S. ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT THE ISI-TALIBAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
In summary, the U.S. has pursued a policy of: engaging and assisting Pakistan to 
expand its capabilities; restraint in the face of Pakistani sponsored attacks; and seeking 
concurrence on U.S. actions in Pakistan. Only the bin Laden raid and a short period of 
drone strikes violated this policy. Ultimately, the U.S. has been unwilling to degrade U.S.-
Pakistan relations further. There are reasons for not taking more significant steps to coerce 
Pakistan that would result in a break in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The U.S. has substantial 
interests in Pakistan, including ensuring the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, 
encouraging democracy, and preventing increased Chinese influence. Similarly, Pakistan 
has enduring interests in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the consistent policies on the part of 
Pakistan and the U.S. across multiple administrations may signal that it is not possible to 
manipulate these nations’ preference orderings through incentives or punishment. In the 
words of President Obama, “Look, we know Pakistan is dysfunctional. I take that as a 
given, the baseline. Let’s work at what we can do. And let’s stop trying to change their 
minds about where Pakistan’s interests lie.”66 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE ISI-TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP 
This chapter analyzes the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-Taliban relationship 
using aspects of principal-agent theory to identify exploitable weaknesses. In particular, 
this chapter examines the motivations that led the ISI to delegate to the Taliban, the sources 
of tension within the association, control methods utilized by the ISI on the Taliban, and 
how these friction points contribute to the overall weaknesses of the relationship.  
A. REASONS TO DELEGATE / MOTIVATIONS 
The motivations for a state to sponsor terrorism fall into two general categories: 
ideology and rational self-interest. Scholars argue that there must be some level of rational 
self-interest and that ideology alone has not been enough to maintain a relationship between 
a state sponsor and a terrorist group in most historical cases.67 In the ISI-Taliban 
relationship, both ideological and self-interest motivations are present. Coll assesses that 
some members within the ISI have ideological connections to the Taliban.68 These same 
individuals view the Taliban as the best method to achieve Pakistan’s interests in 
Afghanistan. 
Principal-agent theory identifies specialization and comparative advantage as 
reasons for the ISI to delegate to the Afghan Taliban.69 By delegating efforts, the ISI 
relieves the Pakistani security apparatus of the need to develop forces specializing in 
unconventional and irregular warfare. Utilizing the Taliban allows Pakistan to dedicate the 
preponderance of its military resources to confront India as well as maintain internal 
security.  
Demonstrating a commitment to Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and increasing 
the credibility that they will protect those interests is a third reason identified in principal-
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agent theory for the ISI to delegate to the Taliban.70 This reason consists of two 
components. First, by creating a more viable Taliban, the ISI has ensured that a group 
inside Afghanistan will continue to look after Pakistan’s interests even with changes in the 
civilian leadership of Pakistan and the possibility of changing policies toward the United 
States (U.S.) and Afghanistan. Second, after the attacks of 9/11, Pakistan could not 
realistically openly reject the previously-mentioned U.S. demands. Therefore, ISI would 
demonstrate Pakistan’s commitment to the Taliban through the clandestine support of the 
group. The Taliban could then actively resist U.S. actions that undermine Pakistan’s 
influence in Afghanistan while maintaining plausible deniability. 
Furthermore, Pakistani demographics and domestic politics motivate the ISI to 
delegate to the Taliban.71 The Afghan Taliban enjoy widespread support among ethnic 
Pashtuns in Pakistan, who number over 30 million of Pakistan’s population of 
approximately 205 million.72 If Pakistan removed its support from the Afghan Taliban, 
this action would likely create a domestic political backlash. At worst, there could be 
increased pressure by Pashtuns for an independent Pashtunistan. Pakistan would likely fear 
that its enemies would take advantage of this situation and support such a movement to 
weaken Pakistan. 
Plausible deniability is not identified by principal-agent theorists as an important 
reason to delegate because the theory is normally applied to legal business transactions. 
However, given the illicit nature of terrorist activities, it is an important reason for state 
sponsors, including the ISI, to delegate.73 The ISI requires the Taliban to conduct actions 
on behalf of Pakistan, but desires anonymity to prevent retaliation from the U.S. and other 
nations. The juxtaposition of requirements to this principal-agent relationship provides a 
weakness that could be exploited to disrupt the association. 
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B. TENSIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
When delegation occurs, principal-agent literature has identified numerous reasons 
for tensions in a relationship. In this section, we will explore several of the theoretical 
tensions that we believe are present in the ISI-Taliban relationship. These include 
differences in payoff structures, differences in information, weakening control as a result 
of increased capabilities, and the possibility of the Taliban spoiling the Pakistani interests. 
Differences in payoff structures based on differences in goals and priorities has 
caused significant tensions within the ISI-Taliban relationship.74 For example, in the past, 
Pakistan has likely provided specific targeting guidance to the Taliban, such as in the attack 
on the Indian embassy in Kabul.75 While the Taliban might also find some benefit in the 
attack by demonstrating the lack of security provided by the U.S. and Afghan governments, 
the killing of civilians risks backlash from the population of Afghanistan. This idea can be 
applied to other attacks such as the seizing of populated areas that often result in high 
civilian casualties. This tension is mitigated by the fact that the Taliban can deny 
responsibility if attacks go poorly and can place blame on government security forces for 
many civilian casualties.  
Differences in information often lead to divergent preferences that negatively 
impact principal-agent relationships.76 This tension can be mitigated by a close, 
information-sharing relationship between the principal and the agent. We assess that this 
is the case with the ISI and the Taliban. However, even different interpretations of the same 
information could lead to differences in preferences between the principal and the agent. 
For example, after the release of the Trump administration’s South Asia Policy, the Taliban 
and Pakistan could have different assessments. Pakistan could assess the claim that the 
U.S. will remain in Afghanistan as long as needed to defeat the Taliban is credible. This 
assessment results in a preference to engage in peace talks. In contrast, the Taliban could 
determine that an indefinite U.S. presence in Afghanistan is not reliable and that the U.S. 
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will likely leave at some point in the near future. This assessment results in a preference to 
continue the campaign of violence until the U.S. departs. 
Loss of control resulting from increased capabilities of the Taliban is a third source 
of tension in the ISI-Taliban relationship.77 Control mechanisms will be discussed later in 
this chapter; however, Pakistan has lost some of its control over the Taliban since 2001. At 
one time, Pakistan provided funding, lethal aid, advice, and guidance to the Taliban. As 
the Taliban took control of territory in Afghanistan, they developed new sources of 
financing from the areas they controlled. Their leadership also became more experienced 
at directing the insurgency. Their leadership developed enough legitimacy and credibility 
to negotiate with countries such as Iran and Russia to diversify their sponsors.78 
An additional source of tension in the ISI-Taliban relationship is a result of the 
Taliban acting as a spoiler while Pakistan has been interested in supporting the peace 
process.79 In 2012 and 2017, high-ranking Pakistani government officials called on the 
Taliban to join peace talks to end the war in Afghanistan.80 One could question whether 
these requests were authentic or just an effort to show the U.S. that Pakistan was attempting 
to end the conflict. If one assumes that they were genuine, Pakistan could have had several 
reasons to support peace. One idea would be that Pakistan assessed that the Taliban were 
in a position to receive significant concessions or political power through peace talks. If 
this was the case, the Taliban acted as spoilers to Pakistan’s interests because the Taliban 
saw the situation differently. They saw an opportunity to win the war outright or stood to 
gain more from continued fighting. 
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 The domestic political costs that Pakistan’s government sometimes faces for 
supporting the Taliban is a final source of tension in the ISI-Taliban relationship. The 
Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are separate 
organizations, but they are not adversaries. Members of different groups travel freely 
through territory held by the other side, and there are some signs that they work together 
in certain situations. The TTP has carried out major terrorist attacks in Pakistan such as the 
Peshawar school attack that killed many children.81 When attacks such as these happen, 
Pakistani citizens are left to question why their government supports a group that is similar 
to the one that attacks them. 
C. CONTROL MECHANISMS 
In principal-agent theory, control mechanisms are methods that the principal can 
use to manage the agent. In the case of state sponsorship of terrorism, the principal and 
agent are balancing agent autonomy with agency losses.82 Increasing control of the agent 
risks exposing the clandestine nature of the support and risks alienating the agent by taking 
away their autonomy. The agent must balance accepting state support with the conditions 
that will be required by the principal. When considering control mechanisms in the ISI-
Taliban relationship, it is best to study the history of the relationship in two periods. 
During the period before 2001, the ISI had numerous control mechanisms to 
manage the Taliban. The lack of international attention on Afghanistan allowed Pakistan 
to support the Taliban overtly. The ISI could manipulate the resources it provided to the 
Taliban to encourage or discourage actions. These resources included direct advising of the 
Taliban by the ISI, funding, lethal aid, and a range of diplomatic options.83 Other 
mechanisms that Pakistan used before 2001 included diplomatic incentives. As stated 
previously, Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban as the official 
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government of Afghanistan.84 Before official recognition, Pakistan tried to increase 
international support for the Taliban at a meeting in Herat with western ambassadors, 
including the U.S. ambassador.85 The additional control mechanisms allowed the ISI to 
make smaller adjustments to the course the Taliban was taking at any time. This included 
leadership decisions and a push to get the Taliban to take the northern regions of 
Afghanistan, under Northern Alliance control at the time.86 
During the period after 2001, the ISI had far fewer control mechanisms at its 
disposal. Several factors caused this lack of options. Overt carrots or encouragement to the 
Taliban were no longer possible due to the U.S. attention on the region. Additionally, the 
Taliban during this period had options to diversify its sources of support to Iran and other 
nations that saw benefits in disrupting U.S. efforts and preventing the rise of other groups 
such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—Khorasan province (ISIS-K). 
After 2001, the most significant control mechanism that the ISI possessed was a 
result of allowing the Taliban leadership so-called sanctuary in Pakistan. By the nature of 
their presence (along with their families) in Pakistani territory, the ISI can apply pressure 
to the Taliban by withholding services or threatening expulsion.87 Agent removal is an 
additional mechanism that involves the principal killing or capturing a leader who exhibits 
interests that are not aligned with the principal or other forms of shirking behavior. An 
example of this in the ISI-Taliban relationship was the death of Mullah Akhtar Mohammed 
Mansour, the leader of the Taliban after Mullah Omar. Mullah Mansour was killed in an 
airstrike in Pakistan. Many analysts believe that his death was engineered by the ISI to 
remove a leader who had lost their trust.88 This trust may have been lost for several reasons. 
First, the Taliban leadership was divided after he assumed control with some supporting 
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him and others disagreeing with the decision. Pakistan may have feared that the Taliban 
could splinter over this issue. Second, Mullah Mansour was seeking support from Iran and 
Russia, and Pakistan may have seen their agent moving further from their influence. Third, 
Mullah Mansour resisted numerous Pakistani demands on the conduct of the conflict in 
Afghanistan and was taking actions to reduce the Taliban’s reliance on Pakistan. If the ISI 
supported or enabled the killing of Mullah Mansour, the ISI risked losing the trust of 
Mansour’s supporters. Even those that did not support Mansour may now have to consider 
that the ISI would betray them in the future if they disagreed.89 
D. ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP 
An understanding of the reasons to delegate, tensions between the principal and 
agent, and control mechanisms in the relationship allows a more thorough assessment of 
the ISI-Taliban relationship. The ISI and Taliban’s motivations are both rational self-
interest and ideology-based; therefore, the reasons to delegate are a strength of this 
relationship. Differences in payoff structures, the loss of control due to increased Taliban 
capabilities, and the Taliban spoiling Pakistan’s efforts at successful settlement are 
weaknesses of this relationship. Most importantly, the lack of mechanisms that provide 
complete ISI control over the Taliban is the most significant weakness of the relationship. 
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IV. OPTIONS FOR DISRUPTING THE ISI-TALIBAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
This chapter focuses on developing options for the United States (U.S.) to reduce 
the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) support of the Taliban. In particular, this chapter will 
identify actions that will exploit weaknesses within the ISI-Taliban relationship based upon 
the reasons that led the ISI to delegate to the Taliban, the sources of tension within the 
association, and control methods utilized by the ISI on the Taliban. These steps are 
intended as a menu of options that would be available to the U.S. to drive a wedge between 
the two organizations. With each strategy, we will seek to provide opportunities that would 
enable the approach to work, show examples of similar strategies being employed, and 
assess the risks involved in applying the strategy. Table 1, summarizes the recommended 
strategies based on the target and the goal. 
Table 1. Strategies for increasing principal-agent problems 
Target Goal Strategy 
Reasons to Delegate Remove or reduce • Reduce deniability 
Tensions Increase • Inflict costs on Taliban for 
receiving support 
• Disinformation 
• Emphasize nationalism concerns 
Control Mechanisms Remove • Reduce presence of Taliban 
leadership in Pakistan 
 
A. REMOVING OR REDUCING THE REASONS TO DELEGATE 
Weakening the ISI’s motivations to delegate to the Taliban is one method to disrupt 
the principal-agent relationship. Reducing the deniability of Pakistani involvement in the 
sponsorship of the Taliban would minimize or eliminate a primary reason for the ISI to 
delegate to the Taliban. The U.S. and Afghan governments should leak or publicize 
intelligence on ISI support of the Taliban. This inability of the Pakistani government to 
deny supporting the Taliban would create a backlash within the international community 
32 
and force Pakistan to choose between continued support of the Taliban or the Afghan 
government. 
An example of how states that support terrorist groups can be exposed and forced 
to withdraw that support is the case of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). The ANO did 
not have a single state sponsor, but they developed relationships with some countries 
including several in eastern Europe as well as Syria. In these relationships, the ANO agreed 
not to attack their host countries if granted permission to operate there in some form. In 
some countries, they were conducting fundraising and recruiting, and in others, they 
conducted training and operational planning. The U.S. received information from allied 
intelligence agencies and threatened to expose these relationships. The countries chose to 
expel or shut down ANO operations within their borders to avoid the exposure.90 
Assuring Pakistan that its interests can be advanced through means other than 
insurgency and terrorism would reduce Pakistan’s need to hedge against changes in U.S. 
policy by supporting the Taliban. Pakistan fears being excluded from any peace process or 
political solution that involves the U.S., GIRoA, and the Taliban. 
Pakistan has withdrawn support for terrorist organizations in the past when the 
reasons to delegate have lessened. The ISI supported the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) in the 1980s and 1990s to apply pressure on India in the conflict over the disputed 
territory of Kashmir. In the 1990s, the ISI recognized that the JKLF’s interests were not 
aligned with Pakistan’s. The JKLF sought an independent Kashmir rather than a Kashmir 
joined with Pakistan. Additionally, the JKLF was not as successful militarily or compliant 
to the ISI’s demands as other militant groups that began to emerge. Pakistan withdrew their 
support of the JKLF as a result.91 
The example of the JKLF, as well as the earlier case of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 
highlights some of the risks involved with these strategies. Pakistan’s history and success 
with delegating to militant organizations mean that the ISI would find a different group 
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than the Taliban to support. This could be a portion of the Taliban willing to meet the ISI’s 
demands and align their interests more with Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan has other 
sources of leverage on Afghanistan that can cause significant problems for U.S. goals there. 
For example, Pakistan regularly threatens to expel Afghan refugees in Pakistan. If Pakistan 
followed through on this threat, Afghanistan would struggle to absorb millions of people 
into fledgling economic and governance systems. 
B. INCREASING THE TENSIONS  
Exacerbating existing tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban could disrupt the 
principal-agent relationship by increasing the chances that one or both sides will develop a 
negative view of their arrangement. First, the U.S. could inflict high costs on the Taliban 
that receive support from Pakistan relative to those that do not receive support. This action 
is meant to create doubts within the Taliban about the value of accepting or not accepting 
ISI support when compared to the costs. Current kinetic efforts are focused on elements of 
the Taliban that are deemed irreconcilable while efforts at peace talks and reconciliation 
are focused on reconcilable portions of the organization. A different strategy, aimed at 
increasing tensions, would be to target the individuals in the Taliban that are closest to the 
ISI. The effectiveness of this strategy would be increased if costs could be inflicted in 
response to actions taken by the Taliban at the direction of the ISI. For example, if the 
Taliban had suffered significant casualties after attacking the Indian embassy, they may 
have questioned whether it was in their interest to conduct attacks on Pakistan’s behalf. 
Second, the U.S. could spread disinformation to increase tension between the ISI 
and the Taliban. In particular, creating suspicion of infiltration has been a successful 
strategy targeting state-sponsored terrorist groups in the past. The ANO was fed 
disinformation that it had been infiltrated by spies. This campaign resulted in internal 
executions of over 300 members of the organization.92 Disinformation campaigns such as 
these can be designed to exploit the principal-agent relationship. The U.S. could feed 
information to the ISI to increase the credibility of the information in the eyes of the 
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Taliban. Another strategy would be to create suspicion whenever a Taliban leader is killed 
that it was the result of the ISI betraying them. The goal of the strategy should be to increase 
suspicion in both directions—in other words, Taliban suspicion of the ISI and ISI suspicion 
of the Taliban. A significant risk of this strategy is the harm that it could do to the 
relationships between the militaries and intelligence agencies of the U.S. and Pakistan. 
Third, the U.S. could exploit nationalism concerns among Pashtuns in Afghanistan 
to increase tension between the ISI and the Taliban. Portraying the Taliban as tools of 
Pakistan because of the support they receive would delegitimize the Taliban to Pashtuns. 
Opponents of Lebanese Hezbollah have achieved some success by communicating a 
parallel narrative in Lebanon. In recent years, Hezbollah has participated in the Syrian civil 
war in support of the Assad regime, one of their sponsors and a fellow client of Iran. This 
participation has come with costs in blood and resources for Lebanese members of the 
group. These costs undermine Hezbollah’s narrative that they are defenders of the 
Lebanese Shia and Christian communities.93 A risk of this strategy is that it potentially 
increases divisions within Afghanistan. By emphasizing Pashtun independence from 
outside influence, the separation between Pashtuns and the other ethnic groups of 
Afghanistan is highlighted. It is not in Pakistan’s interests for Afghanistan to be divided 
into two states for many reasons. It is also likely not in the interests of the U.S. or 
Afghanistan’s other neighbors. 
C. REMOVING THE CONTROL MECHANISMS  
Lack of control mechanisms by the ISI is the most exploitable weakness within the 
ISI-Taliban relationship. Physical control of the Taliban leadership and their families in 
Pakistan is the primary control mechanism utilized by the ISI. Knowing their locations and 
providing the necessities, most notably security, balances the scales more in favor of the 
ISI. This mechanism is so important that losing this form of control over the Taliban would 
likely severely reduce or stop the ISI from providing support. To eliminate this control 
                                                 




mechanism, the U.S. and Afghanistan could take multiple actions to influence the Taliban 
leadership to reside in Afghanistan. The U.S. could make Pakistan less secure for Taliban 
leaders by increasing targeting within Pakistan. As part of negotiations, a place in 
Afghanistan could be offered to the Taliban leaders and their families. This location would 
be safe from targeting efforts and limit Pakistani influence. General Abdul Raziq, the 
former police chief of Kandahar province who was killed in 2018 in an attack claimed by 
the Taliban, proposed a sanctuary for Taliban who wanted to reconcile. He established such 
an area and oversaw the return of several dozen former militants from Pakistan.94 General 
Raziq’s success in maintaining security in Kandahar province made him an important 
target for the Taliban. His efforts to have even farther-reaching effects on the conflict by 
bringing Taliban leaders out of Pakistan, may have made him a target for Pakistan as well. 
The return of Taliban leaders to Afghanistan could be viewed as an intermediate 
step toward a political solution. A previous examination of including insurgents in political 
processes identified four key factors for success: (1) the population, government, and 
insurgents must believe that there is a stalemate or no military solution to the conflict; (2) 
the government should not require disarmament as a precondition in order to maintain the 
stalemate; (3) the government must recognize the legitimacy of the insurgency and its 
leaders; and (4) government institutions must be strong enough to manage the inclusion of 
insurgents.95 Other studies have raised similar points.96 An essential step to creating these 
conditions in Afghanistan is granting some level of amnesty to leaders to legitimize them 
and allow them to enter the political process. It would also demonstrate that disarmament 
of the entire organization is not a precondition for their political involvement. 
One way to analyze the potential value of killing Taliban leaders would be to 
overlay Freeman’s theory on terrorist leadership with our proposal to disrupt the principal-
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agent relationship. This combination of theories results in Figure 1. If the principal-agent 
relationship is good and the leader provides operational guidance and inspiration, the U.S. 
should concur and work with Pakistan to remove the leader. If the principal-agent 
relationship is not good and the leader does not provide operational guidance and 
inspiration, the U.S. should disrupt Pakistan’s efforts to remove the leader. If the principal-
agent relationship is not good and the leader provides operational direction and inspiration, 
or the principal-agent relationship is good and the leader does not provide operational 
direction and inspiration, the decision may have to be based on other factors. The decision 
would need to analyze the importance of the leader to the organization against the 
importance of the principal or the sponsor. Additional elements that would need to be 
considered including the likely successors to the leader and their relationship or standing 
with the principal. Additionally, an analysis of the positive and negative effects of the 
sponsor would need to be included. For example, the principal may provide little support 
and restrain the group significantly. 
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Figure 1. Leadership targeting and principal-agent problems 
D. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. military viewed the killing of Mullah Mansour in the same way that other 
targeted killings of terrorist leaders have been viewed: an opportunity to remove a leader 
from an organization. Leaders generally provide inspiration and/or operational direction to 
their organization. Removing a leader who provides these functions is likely to be effective 
at causing disruption to the organization.97 Furthermore, there is a possibility of causing 
conflict over the succession plan. 
Unfortunately, in hindsight, the killing of Mullah Mansour may have had some 
unifying effects on the Taliban. The Taliban were not unified under Mullah Mansour. After 
it was revealed that Mullah Omar had been dead for years and the secret kept from the 
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world, including much of the Taliban, some leaders were upset with Mullah Mansour. The 
leadership had not chosen Mullah Mansour. Instead he assumed the position and then used 
the power of the position to consolidate his hold on the organization. During his leadership, 
the Taliban had begun to show fractures. His killing by the U.S. allowed the leadership to 
choose new leaders that brought back together some of the factions.98 
If the U.S. instead viewed the Mullah Mansour situation as an opportunity to 
increase principal-agent problems between the ISI and the Taliban, the strategy may have 
been different. The fact that Pakistan condoned or orchestrated the killing would be the 
indicator that during that time period these problems had increased. The strategy could 
have been to provide safe haven to Mullah Mansour inside of Afghanistan. Another option 
that could have been done in conjunction with his killing or with providing him safe haven 
would be disinformation campaigns. An option for this type of campaign would be to 
convince other Taliban leaders that Pakistan planned to orchestrate their killing. Another 
option would be to convince the Taliban leaders that their network had been infiltrated by 
sources providing information to the U.S. The U.S. could have also leaked information on 
Pakistan’s knowledge of the Taliban leader’s location. Pakistan consistently denies that it 
knows the location of the leaders of the Taliban. 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS  
The framework outlined in this project may apply to other state-sponsored terrorist 
groups, insurgencies, and proxies. Examining the reasons to delegate, reasons for tensions 
in the relationship, and the control mechanisms employed by the principal may provide 
strategies that make supporting proxies less attractive. As mentioned previously, there are 
risks with removing the support of a sponsor. In some situations, the principal uses the 
control mechanisms to moderate the actions of an extreme group and places an upper limit 
on the capabilities of the group. 
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